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Drug courts are programs for people who experience substance abuse disorders and have 
been accused of a crime and are perceived as being likely to reoffend. The purpose is to 
provide a therapeutic approach with reducing the risk of future offense by supporting 
treatment for the defendant. Drug courts are cost-effective for state and local 
governments and are often funded through a combination of state appropriations and 
federal grants. Little is known how political ideology may influence the state and local 
budget process that support drug courts.  Using Shafritz’s power and politics theory as 
the foundation, the purpose of this study was to understand the extent political ideology 
influences support for drug courts by voters and judges in a single judicial district in a 
Midwestern State.  Survey data was first collected from 106 registered voters, with 67 
usable responses, and data were analyzed using logistic regression analysis. The 
registered voter results were statistically significant with 71.6% (p=.002) respondents 
supporting treatment, which increased to 85.4% (p=.001) when knowing there was 
judicial oversight for drug court. Through descriptive research, 45 judges participated 
with findings indicating support for drug courts and no outside influences which impact 
decision making. The positive social change implication stemming from this study 
include recommendations to state policy makers to provide information and education 
about drug courts.  Following this recommendation may result in support for increased 
budgetary spending to sustain drug courts.  This, in turn, allows drug courts to continue, 
where offenders can receive substance abuse treatment which may result in fewer drug 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
In 1971, President Nixon declared a “war on drugs,” calling illegal narcotics 
public enemy number one (“It is time to end,” 2009).  The objective of this “war” was to 
obtain a drug-free country by fighting against people who use and sell illegal drugs 
(Miranda, 1998).  War, according to Carl von Clausewitz, is defined as “an act of 
violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (Miranda, 1998).  The war 
on drugs was not against drugs, but a war on people who use and sell illegal drugs 
(Miranda, 1998).  This war continues today with law enforcement requesting $9.2 billion 
in funding in 2018 alone (Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP], 2017).  
Further, opioid overdoses are increasing, requiring law enforcement and EMTs to carry 
NARCAN to prevent an overdose death (Kennedy, 2018).  Despite the benefits of 
addressing the drug problem in the United States, it is important to look at the costs such 
as drug courts that have been implemented.  
Background of the Study 
The war on drugs has accelerated arrest and incarceration rates since 1971.  In 
2005 and 2006, drug arrests totaled 1,846,351 and 1,889,810, respectively (“Drug War 
Facts,” n.d.).  Since 2006, drug arrests have hovered on average around 1.5 million each 
year (“Drug War Facts,” n.d.).  The total number of drug arrests in the United States in 
2010 was 1,638,846 and remained consistent with a slight drop by 2017 to 1,632,921 
(“Drug War Facts,” n.d.).  Thus, drugs continue to affect lives and families, burden the 
criminal court system, and create prison overflow.   
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Drug courts were created to stem the flow from courtroom to prison for drug 
offenders, as the same drug addicted defendant routinely appeared in front of the same 
prosecutors, judges, prison officials, and parole officers.  For example, recidivism rates 
increased from 322,000 in 1970 to more than 1.3 million in 1998 (Burke, 2010).  Though 
the war on drugs attacks the supply of illegal narcotics, drug courts focus on the demand 
or the user (Burke, 2010).  In November 1988, Herbert Klein, a circuit court judge in 
Florida, noted continual placement of drug offenders on probation perpetuated the 
problem, as the same offenders were seen repeatedly and would eventually be 
incarcerated for nonviolent drug offenses, which occupied space in prisons that violent 
offenders could fill (Warren, 2009).  Seeing this need, Judge Klein became a proponent 
for drug courts; thus, the first drug court was implemented in Miami, Florida.  After 
Miami, drug courts expanded across the United States in areas like New York.  Various 
jurisdictions determined a need and tried to provide a court-related service to reduce drug 
use, crime related to illegal drug use, and provide alternatives to incarceration.  There 
were more than 3,400 drug court programs in the United States by 2015 (“Drug Courts,” 
2015).  To date, there are no drug courts in the federal criminal justice system because 
most federal drug cases relate to major drug trafficking organizations rather than users, 
and drug courts are necessary to attack addiction not trafficking.   
Drug courts can vary, especially when they number in the thousands.  For 
example, the Fifth Judicial District Drug Court located in Polk County, Iowa was 
established in 1997 and operates as a diversionary program away from incarceration 
supporting participants in treatment and rehabilitation (Annual Report, 2018).  This 
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program is called the “Intensive Supervision Court Program,” otherwise known as drug 
court (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.).  This 15-month program consists of a team comprised 
of individuals from the judicial and community corrections system and treatment 
providers including a judge, a probation supervisor, prosecutor, defense attorney, 
probation officers, treatment counselors, and a secretary (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.).  
This program’s mission is “to promote public safety by facilitating positive changes in 
the attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of drug addicted offenders” (Fifth Judicial District, 
n.d.).  The program begins with an initial screening process before proceeding through 
five phases, each with different goals, activities, and requirements that the participant 
must complete before moving onto the next phase (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.).  A 
successful participant is one who completes all phases and is moved to the alumni 
support group (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.).   
Research associated with determining the effectiveness, impact, and cost-
efficiency of drug courts is funded through the National Institute of Justice (“Drug 
Courts,” 2015).  Through National Institute of Justice funded research, drug courts have 
resulted in a cost savings of $5,680 to $6,208 per offender despite higher treatment costs 
(“Drug Courts,” 2015).  However, these higher treatment costs affect the long-term 
viability of drug courts.  Budgets are often tied to results, and if a program is not 
producing results, then it receives little to no funding or is cut altogether.  For instance, 
when only 20 drug court participants out of 100 do not recidivate, a state legislature may 
not see the return on their investment when budgeting funds.  But research supports the 
benefits of specialty courts, focusing on the cost-benefit analysis of the programs in 
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addition to the rehabilitative and reduction in recidivism benefits.  For example, Marlow, 
DeMatteo, and Festinger (2003) noted that there is a reduction in recidivism of up to 3 
times greater than any other initiative.  Further, considering financial and budgetary 
crunches, Shepard (2010) argued that the justice system must find a solution for effective 
penalties for crimes but be mindful of providing services within times of budgetary 
shortfalls.  The justice system must be innovative, especially when specialty courts such 
as drug courts provide cost benefits and effectiveness (Shepard, 2010).   
Although there is much discussion on the cost-benefit analysis of drug courts, 
there is little discussion on whether the public supports it.  Research has indicated that a 
small majority believed treatment is better than incarceration; however, most individuals 
have also believed that funding for incarceration is more important than treatment 
(Giordano, 2014).  Though there has been an increase in public support for treatment 
rather than incarceration, there is still the question of whether political ideology 
influences this support, especially if individuals know there was judicial oversight of 
treatment such as through drug courts.  Thus, this research was conducted to answer what 
influence political ideology has over drug court support and whether drug courts 
influence those who support incarceration.   
Problem Statement 
Drug courts are controversial because they go against the idea of court or the 
criminal justice system.  Typical criminal courts are adversarial, yet in drug court, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys play a reduced or minimal role and in some 
circumstances are not even present during proceedings (Nolan, 2003).  Although this 
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seems unconventional, defense attorneys and prosecutors appear to understand the need 
for this specialty court.  In addition, the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of 
State Court Administrators endorsed the problem-solving court model, and the American 
Bar Association also adopted a resolution in support of problem-solving courts (Nolan, 
2003).  
Despite understanding and support from stakeholders like judges and attorneys, 
specialty courts have their critics as well, especially because of flaws in research 
supporting them.  Research has indicated a reduction in recidivism but with only cursory 
statements of findings rather than evidence supported with methodology (Marlow et al., 
2003).  Similar, research has suggested that those who participated in a drug court were 
less likely to recidivate than nonparticipants (Mitchell, Wilson, Eggers, & MacKenzie, 
2012); however, questions were raised as to whether recidivism increased once 
participants completed drug court and no longer had oversight.  In addition to these types 
of flaws in research, critics have argued that drug courts are a testament to political 
appeal not effectiveness, as they provide a cover for politicians (Hoffman, 2012).  
Further, though drug courts are based on federal grants and use less court staff, they have 
attempted to place as many individuals as possible into this specialty court, which 
increases the number of drug cases and subsequent imprisonment rather than treatment 
when defendants do not want to rehabilitate (Hoffman, 2012).   
Regardless of the support or critique of drug courts, those offering their research 
or opinion typically have some tie to the justice system.  The little research from the 
customer perspective has shown that attorneys believed that defendants got what they 
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deserved (fair outcome), whereas the public felt that they received a case that was 
handled fairly (fair procedure) as opposed to a fair outcome (Burke, 2010).  There has 
also been little research in the last 5 years as it relates to public support for treatment.  
However, some research has suggested that respondents felt more comfortable supporting 
treatment if there was court oversight (Giordano, 2015).  Research continually shows 
support for drug treatment, yet there are still those who believe in incarceration as the 
best method.  Thus, an analysis of the public’s support of drug court must be undertaken 
to determine whether the public is aware of the specialty courts, whether they believe 
there is fairness and justice within the specialty court, and their overall support of these 
programs. 
Purpose 
This quantitative study was intended to explore whether political ideology affects 
support for drug courts and if those who believe in incarceration as the best method 
change their opinion when they are aware of the threat of incarceration through drug 
court.  Despite the reported benefits of specialty courts, there is limited research on the 
overall effect of public’s support or lack thereof for these courts, especially considering 
the current political climate within the United States (Giordano, 2014).  For example, the 
Trump Administration has led to an increase law enforcement’s resources related to 
immigration and crime.  The purpose of this study was to discover society’s support of 
drug courts and how this may affect the courts’ future and viability, which may assist the 
criminal justice system in determining whether drug courts will remain popular and 
whether funding will continue.  The dependent variable related to public opinion is 
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support for drug courts and political party identification was the independent variable. 
For judicial opinion, the dependent variable is support for drug courts, and the 
independent variables are public influence, prior drug court experience, length of time as 
a judge, opinion of treatment vs. incarceration, and appointed by a Democrat or 
Republican governor.   
Research Questions 
Research Question 1: Does an individual’s political ideology influence their 
support for funding of specialty drug courts?  
H01: An individual’s political ideology does not influence their support for 
funding of specialty drug courts.  
H0a: An individual’s political ideology does influence their support for funding 
of specialty drug courts.    
H02: An individual who previously supported incarceration will not support drug 
court when knowing there is judicial oversight. 
H0a: An individual who previously supported incarceration will support drug 
court when knowing there is judicial oversight. 
Research Question 2: Are judges affected by public views sentencing a defendant 
to drug court?  
Research Question 3: Are judges affected by the gubernatorial policies of the 




The theoretical framework relative to this study is power and politics.  Power and 
politics relate to the various players within the criminal justice system who can support 
the continued funding of drug courts (Shafritz et al, 2016).  Power has the capability to 
effect or influence change (French & Raven, 1959).  Change can be thoughts, opinions, 
ideas, values and behavior (French & Raven, 1959).  More power is related to having a 
strong base of power, meaning the stronger the base power, the greater the power (French 
& Raven, 1959).  Power and politics rejects the normal assumptions from the classical or 
neoclassical theories, which assumes that people in positions of authority set goals and 
the purpose of the organization is to achieve the set goals (Shafritz et al, 2016).  This 
suggests that legislators would set the goals in the best interests of the public, including 
funding.  Classical theory also focuses on how best to create and manage the organization 
to achieve the goals effectively and efficiently (Shafritz et al., 2016), but the government 
is not always efficient.   
When looking at power and politics theory, organizations are viewed as a 
complex compilation of individuals and coalitions.  For example, there are influencers 
who seek to control the organization by using their means or influence (Shafritz, et al, 
2016).  These influencers could also be society, the individuals, who collectively elect an 
individual to represent their interests.  On the other hand, society, collectively can vote to 
unseat an individual who they feel do not represent their interests.   
Shafritz, et al., (2016) argues power accomplishes established goals and people in 
positions of authority set these goals (Shafritz, et al, 2016).  Yet the people in “power” 
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are elected to the position by the electorate, thus who maintains power and control?  An 
elected official has control of a resource (i.e. funding), but the electorate maintains the 
power of the ballot.  Understanding that more people support treatment over incarceration 
yet support funding for incarceration, the people have the power to influence and direct 
the government toward what they feel is necessary.  What the government spends its 
money in can be directly attributable to the power given to the people, if they exercise it.   
Nature of the Study 
The nature of this study was a quantitative, nonexperimental research design 
assessing for causal relationships.  Causal relationships develop when one variable causes 
another to change or exist (O’Sullivan et. al, 2017).  For example, at the most basic level, 
the research analyzed society’s support and its effects on drug courts.  For analyzing the 
public’s view, the dependent variable is support for drug court for both public and 
judicial surveys, and the independent variable included political party identification.  In 
addition to determining the public’s views, data were also collected from judges.  The 
dependent variable is support for drug court and the independent variables include prior 
drug court experience, length of time as a judge, preference of treatment vs. incarceration 
and the gubernatorial political party which appointed the judge.   
Surveys for both the public and judges were developed by the researcher.  The 
population sample for judges is all district court judges for the Midwestern state.  The 
population sample for the public came from registered voters in a judicial district in the 
Midwestern state, which consists of 11 counties.  The judicial survey was administered 
10 
 
via online survey.  The public survey was mailed to 1,000 randomly chosen registered 
voters.  Data were collected and analyzed with logistic regression analysis.   
Definitions 
Drug court: Although there are various methods of drug courts operations, drug 
courts for the purpose of this study are a treatment program overseen by the courts with a 
potential or threat of incarceration.   
Political party identity: This is the independent variable for Research Question 1 
and was determined by the political party the participant self-reports they are registered.  
The political parties available for respondents are Democrat or Republican.  According to 
this Midwestern state’s auditor, these are the only two recognized political parties.       
Assumptions 
For this study, it was assumed that drug courts generally operated in the same 
manner, with participants entering a court supervised drug treatment program with threat 
of punishment/incarceration.  It was also assumed that survey participants had a general 
knowledge of illegal drug abuse issues and that there was some form of treatment 
available.  Finally, it was assumed that district court judges felt safe in expressing or 
providing data based on the confidentiality and anonymity provided. It was therefore 
assumed that judges were honest and truthful in providing answers related to drug court 
sentencing and public influence.  It was also assumed those who are registered to vote 
also exercise their right to vote by participating in elections, including local and state 
elections.   
11 
 
Scope and Delimitations 
This study limited the sample in two different methods.  First, this study was 
limited to a Midwestern State.  Though illegal drug abuse is a national epidemic, certain 
areas of the United States experience different choices of illegal drugs.  This study was 
focused on a Midwestern state where the manufacture of methamphetamine plagued the 
State, resulting in implementing various law criminalizing such actions as buying 
pseudoephedrine.  On the other hand, Southwestern states may experience 
methamphetamine as an imported illegal drug from Mexico.  Second, this study limited 
the sample to participants who were registered voters, and individuals who are not 
registered to vote were not considered.   
Limitations 
At the time of this study, the United States is in the middle of President Donald 
Trump’s first administration and the 2020 Presidential election campaigns began for both 
political parties.  The United States previously had 8 years of Democratic President Barak 
Obama.  However, this study did not track or determine whether the change in 
presidential administration affected political party ideology and what effect political 
rhetoric may have had on voters’ views of drug court. The limitation was strictly to 
political party and not whether there was effect by presidential administration or rhetoric.   
Another limitation of this study is that not every individual who is registered to 
vote exercises their right to do so.  Potential participant bias may also be whether 
individuals have been victimized by an individual under the influence of illegal drugs.  
Finally, the structure of drug courts varies widely across the country, so generalizability 
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of the findings to organizations within alternative operating structures was not possible.  
Although overall generalizability of drug courts may be valid, participants’ experiences 
cannot be generalized.   
Significance 
Resources are given, cut, or eliminated by executive and legislative branches of 
government during the budgeting process, yet obtaining funding is necessary for the 
judicial branch to continue to function properly.  Considering recidivism and the 
increasing numbers of defendants, especially drug offenders, financial resources are 
necessary to reduce costs for law enforcement, corrections, and ultimately society.  
However, despite the requests for funding from the judicial branch, funding is not 
increased, and in many cases, funding is cut or substantially reduced.  Each legislator is 
influenced to his or her respective electorate and districts, which creates a problem in 
determining legislative funding priorities that are also reflective of the priorities of voters.  
Decisions are based on constituent’s reactions and support, which may change over time.  
For example, under the Obama Administration, many nonviolent drug offenders’ 
sentences were commuted; however, under the Trump Administration more vigilant 
efforts are made to increase law enforcement’s resources, specifically immigration and 
crime (Horwitz, 2017; Mitchell, 2018).  Further, legislators will approve funding for what 
they may see as a better return on their investment, which can be difficult to justify for 
drug addicted criminals.  But if funding is not provided to drug courts, this court-
supervised treatment option could be eliminated.   
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Drug court research has focused on recidivism and cost-benefit analysis; however, 
there is little research on societal views and whether this has ramifications on funding.  
The purpose of this quantitative study was to discover society’s support or nonsupport of 
drug court and understand how this may affect the long-term viability of drug court.  This 
information will assist the criminal justice system in determining whether drug courts 
will remain popular and whether funding will continue.  Society and judges supporting 
drug courts has significance for implementing and/or maintaining drug courts in the 
Midwestern state in this study.  If there is overall support for drug courts, as opposed to 
incarceration, elected officials must take notice of their electorates’ desires for how their 
taxes should be spent.   
Summary 
Illegal drug use is a problem within the United States.  The government has 
addressed this problem through incarceration; however, realizing that incarceration is not 
fixing or addressing the problem, treatment has garnered more support.  But even with 
more support for treatment, there are opponents of drug court.  This study addressed 
whether political ideology predicts support for drug courts as well as whether support can 
increase with knowledge of a drug court being supervised with the threat of incarceration. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Previously, public sentiment has been focused on incarcerating individuals over 
treatment, but public support for treatment is increasing and so is treatment policy and 
funding.  One method of treatment, with judicial oversight, emerged in the 1990s in the 
form of drug courts.  The idea behind drug court was to provide an alternative to 
incarceration but also provide cost-saving measures while reducing recidivism (Mitchell, 
2011).  Subsequent research has indicated that there is some benefit to drug courts, with 
cost-savings and a reduction in recidivism (2018 Annual Report, n.d.; Department of 
Corrections, n.d.; Katsiyannis et al., 2018); however, not everyone believes drug courts 
are successful or worthwhile.  Prior research focused on whether the public supported 
treatment over incarceration; however, there is little research that indicates if there is 
support for drug courts.  Further, there is little research that indicates whether individuals 
who previously supported incarceration might change their view if they were aware of 
judicial oversight drug courts.  This research was conducted to answer these questions.   
Drug Court 
For some, drug court is innovative and has the potential for social change by 
providing rehabilitation and treatment in lieu of incarceration. But for others, drug 
offenders were not punished or punished enough for committing crimes.  This may be 
because the public may not fully understand drug courts other than they keep drug users 
out of prison or avoids punishment.   
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Drug court is an alternative to incarceration by diverting drug offenders to 
treatment as opposed to prison, combining community-based treatment with court 
oversight (Rempel et al., 2012).  There are many components to a drug court program and 
while each court may vary, it follows a predictive pattern in its organization.  Depending 
on the drug court, a participant can enter the program pre-plea or post-plea (Mitchell, 
2011).  Generally, after arrest, a drug-offender is screened to determine eligibility, and if 
they are, charges will be reduced or possibly dismissed (although dismissal is unlikely; 
Mitchell, 2011).  Once in drug court, the participant appears before the drug court judge 
and must comply with the court’s requirements, including urinalysis, attending treatment, 
and appearing at status conferences (Mitchell, 2011).  Appearance at status hearings is 
most vital as this is where the drug court judge, in addition to others, collaborate 
(Mitchell, 2011).  Depending on the drug court, the participant will move through three 
or more phases before successfully completing the program, which can vary in time from 
a year to 2-and-a-half years (Mitchell, 2011).  Most do not successfully complete the 
program, and successful graduation is just under 50% (Mitchell, 2011).  Those who are 
unsuccessful typically are charged with new crimes, relapse, fail to attend treatment 
and/or drug court hearings, or simply leave the program (Mitchell, 2011).   
One example of a drug court is the Fifth Judicial District Drug Court Program in 
Des Moines, Iowa, otherwise known as Polk County Drug Court, which has been in 
existence for over 20 years (2018 Annual Report, n.d.).  The Polk County Drug Court 
accepts participants who are drug using and have been sentenced to this program.  The 
goal is to supervise, drug test, and provide treatment to nonviolent drug offenders, along 
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with incentives and sanctions that may result in incarceration (2018 Annual Report, n.d.).  
Participants are non-violent drug offenders who are diverted from the criminal justice 
system, with the threat of sanctions, which may result in incarceration (2018 Annual 
Report, n.d.).  Drug dealers and those with assaultive or violent offenses are precluded 
from the program (2018 Annual Report, n.d.).  The process for the Polk County Drug 
Court is as follows: An individual may be referred to the program by the county 
attorney’s office, attorneys, Department of Corrections, family and friends, and other 
drug court participants.  Each referred and potential participant is screened thoroughly by 
reviewing prior criminal history, police reports, community corrections history and any 
other relevant information, which is then followed by an in-person interview where 
behaviors are also analyzed.  A treatment evaluation follows to determine the level of 
care needed and after this rigorous process a determination of whether the individual is 
accepted into the program is made (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.).  Once an individual is 
ordered into drug court by the drug court judge, the participant will travel through five 
different phases: Phase 1: Stabilization; Phase 2: Recovery; Phase 3: Abstinence; Phase 
4: Pre-Release; and Phase 5: Support.  As the drug court participant moves through the 
phases, requirements become less as the participant gains more control over their 
addiction; however, sanctions are also imposed for rule violations on a gradual and 
sliding scale (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.).  Once a person successfully completes Phase 5, 




As evidenced by the Fifth Judicial District Department of Corrections, cost 
benefits do exist to drug courts.  The Fifth Judicial District Corrections reported an 
average cost of $15.39/day for each participant (2018 Annual Report, n.d.) compared to 
the Iowa Department of Corrections average cost to incarcerate an individual of $90.03 
(Department of Corrections, n.d.).  However, the effectiveness of drug courts is based on 
an individual’s perspective.  For instance, there is a dichotomy between 
treatment/rehabilitation and courts.  Combining treatment for a disease and the penal 
system is at odds with the goals of each.  For example, those who support treatment 
believe that there has been a war waged against drug addicts, with governmental funding 
supporting crime control not rehabilitation (Walsh, 2011).  Further, traditionally the 
justice system is predicated on conflict, where the prosecution fights for conviction and 
the defense fights for the defendant.  But in drug courts, the prosecutor and defense 
attorney work alongside treatment providers and a drug court judge.      
Governmental budgets provide an indication of policy agendas and goals 
regarding the cost benefit and effectiveness of drug courts.  In May 2017, the White 
House released the national drug control budget, providing highlights of 2018’s fiscal 
year budget (ONDCP, 2017).  Drug prevention and treatment, including drug courts, is 
included in the budget of $99.9 million set aside for drug courts (ONDCP, 2017).  The 
money supports prevention, treatment, interdiction, international operations and law 
enforcement, with a focus on opioid addiction.  Figure 1 shows the increase from 2016 to 
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2018 in treatment and a slight dip in law enforcement (ONDCP, 2017).  Additionally, 
interdiction received a slight increase, whereas prevention was reduced (ONDCP, 2017).  
 
Figure 1. Federal drug resources by function. From ONDCP (2017). 
Further, Health and Human Services received $59.9 million, and the Department of 
Justice received $40 million to work together to enhance court services, coordination, and 
substance abuse treatment for adult and juvenile drug courts (ONDCP, 2017).  Funding 
for treatment has increased incrementally since 2016, whereas law enforcement has 
remained relatively unchanged (ONDCP, 2017).  Based on this funding, the federal 
government appears to see the benefit of drug courts and the goal to reduce recidivism, 
provide treatment to those addicted, and improve the chances of rehabilitation with 
“early, continuous, and intense judicially supervised treatment, mandatory periodic drug 
testing, community supervision, appropriate sanctions and other rehabilitation services” 
(ONDCP, 2017, p. 11).  This funding also acknowledges the opioid crisis within the 
United States, which has become a priority (ONDCP, 2019).   
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One reason why drug courts are popular is the availability of federal funding, 
which is a testament to their viability.  Though drug courts can get their funding from 
private or local entities, the largest segment of funding comes from the Department of 
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, and Bureau of Justice Assistance.  There have been a 
variety of drug court funding from grants; however, the  grant solicitation in 2016 was the 
Adult Drug Court Discretionary Grant Program.  These grants are helpful for 
implementation of a new drug court program but also enhancement for an already 
existing program (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2016).  For either category, the 
maximum funding is $500,000.  There are also significant requirements, including 
evidence-based practices supported by the National Association of Drug Court 
Professionals and a financial match whether “in-kind or cash” (Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 2016).  Federal funds awarded under the this grant also cannot cover more 
than 75% of the program’s total costs, and the applicants must disclose who and how the 
remaining 25% will be funded and how it will match funds (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
2016).  Thus, local and state governments must determine if they can provide the 
remaining funding and whether they want to.   
Although research has supported the economic benefit of drug courts, there are 
questions about whether the results justify funding these programs.  In 1998, there were 
1,262,546 drug arrests within the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigations, n.d.).  
The United States reached an all-time high of drug arrests in 2006 and 2007 with roughly 
1,420,000 in each year (Federal Bureau of Investigations, n.d.).  There was a consistent 
reduction in drug arrests since 2007; however, the United States saw an uptick in 2016, 
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with a jump to 1,285,186 (Federal Bureau of Investigations, n.d.).  With arrests comes 
convictions and incarceration, which significantly increased the prison population and 
culminated in many initiatives.  The most recent was President Trump signing the First 
Step Act in December 2018 (Drug Policy Alliance, 2018), which reduced drug sentences 
for certain offenders within the federal system.  These initiatives address the prison 
population after offenders (i.e. drug addicts) have been sentenced and most likely spent 
many years behind bars.  Drug courts emerged as another method to prevent prison 
overpopulation, but drug courts are not without their own problems.   
One argument against drug courts is that probation, otherwise known as 
community corrections, does not address the addiction of clients.  Some argue that drug 
courts do what probation offices did or could do with resources and are limited in their 
options for treatment (Walsh, 2011).  Though research on a multi-site evaluation of adult 
drug courts over a period of 5 years showed positive effects of drug court, there was also 
room for improvement.  For example, by enlarging the potential population, drug courts 
can also include high-risk offenders, who may not be included even though they need 
treatment because of the chances of them relapsing or recidivating, which affects positive 
statistics (Rempel et al, 2012).  Additionally, for a drug court and judicial oversight to be 
effective, a judge must focus their time and efforts on those who need extra attention, 
though this takes this judge away from regular duties and places additional burden and 
cost on other judges (Rempel et al., 2012).  
Another argument against drug courts is that the threat of sanctions is the only 
thing that ensures the effectiveness of this problem-solving court.  Walsh (2011) argued 
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that front end treatment, pre-arrest, is just as effective, and the need for threat of sanctions 
was unwarranted.  Walsh also argued that research from Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services indicates there is little to no difference between the success of a drug 
addict referred through the criminal justice system as opposed through other means.  In 
most circumstances, drug court requires a crime to be committed to take advantage of the 
program, which is also counterintuitive to assisting those who need drug treatment.  The 
Drug Policy Alliance (2011) has also argued that drug courts have not improved public 
safety because drug court participants must commit a crime to receive the alleged 
benefits.  Further, there are arguments of little cost savings and not reducing the prison 
population (Drug Policy Alliance, 2011).   
Despite arguments against drug courts, for proponents, drug courts have a 
successful impact on the lives of the addicted.  The most important goal is the reduction 
in recidivism.  Katsiyannis, Whitford, Zhang and Gage (2018) conducted a meta-analysis 
of recidivism studies from 1994-2015 and noted that within 5 years of release in 2005, 
77% of offenders were rearrested and of those, 29% were arrested for a violent crime 
(Durose et al., 2015; Katsiyannis et al., 2018).  The main predictor for recidivism of 
general offenders was substance abuse, which was a strong predictor for sexual offenders 
and second predictor for violent offenders (Katsiyannis et al, 2018).  Therefore,  effective 
treatment strategies must be implemented for offenders to address their controllable 
predictor, substance abuse (Katsiyannis, et al, 2018).  Katsiyannis, et al. (2018) noted 
there are static predictors, consisting of traits such as age, gender, race, among others; 
and dynamic predictors, which are factors which can change, such as criminogenic needs.  
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While this study did not relate to drug courts, it does present an argument of the affect 
substance abuse does have on an offender. 
Though drug courts are intended to reduce recidivism, the other argument for 
implementation is to provide an alternative to incarceration and reduce the burden on 
correctional services.  A meta-analysis focusing on whether this burden on corrections is 
alleviated by drug court provided mixed results.  Sevigny, Fuleihan and Ferdik (2013) 
studied the effectiveness of drug courts as an alternative to incarceration and found that 
drug courts were positive in reducing incarceration compared to other community-based 
correction interventions.  They estimated that drug courts reduced the incarceration rate 
from a base rate of 50% to 42% for jail, 38% for prison, and 32% overall incarceration 
(Sevigny et al., 2013).  But they also found that drug court participants did not spend any 
less time incarcerated, which may be due to drug courts using an increase in sanctions for 
program violations or incarceration for those who fail the program (Sevigny et al., 2013).   
Despite a potential benefit of reducing recidivism, research shows the impact on 
the corrections system may not be realized with drug court.  The U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has from 1997 until 2011 collected data and analyzed the 
effectiveness of drug courts.  In 1997, the GAO reported from their survey at the end of 
1996 that 48% of drug court participants successfully completed the program (GAO, 
1997, p. 56).  But the GAO also stated it could not provide conclusions as to 
effectiveness and recidivism (GAO, 1997).  Most of the reason for the inability to provide 
a conclusion was due to limitations in the evaluations, such as failing to analyze 
outcomes other than program participation and using any comparison data (GAO, 1997).  
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However, even when it was difficult to see where the benefits were recognized, the 
number of drug courts increased.  In 1997, the GAO reported 42 drug courts began 
between 1989 and 1994 (GAO, 1997).  Since 1994, four drug courts closed and 123 new 
drug courts were implemented for a total of 161 drug courts in operation by April 1997 
(GAO, 1991).  By 2011, when it appears the GAO conducted the last study regarding 
effectiveness of drug courts, the GAO reported as of June 2010, there were more than 
2500 drug courts nationwide (GAO, 2011).  Of the 2,500 drug courts, 1,400 of those 
courts were adult drug courts (GAO, 2011).   
Federal grant funds were provided for drug courts, and to study the effect of drug 
court, the Department of Justice required grantees to provide performance measurement 
data (GAO, 2011).  In 2005, the GAO used comparison groups and concluded evidence 
showed a reduction in recidivism for drug court participants during the time they were 
involved in the program and receiving treatment (GAO, 2005).  There were questionable 
results for recidivism for the time period after a person completed drug court 
programming (GAO, 2005).  By 2011, more robust data allowed better conclusions.  The 
GAO reported lower recidivism for those who had participated in a drug court program 
(GAO, 2011).   
Effectiveness of reducing recidivism was also supported by a meta-analytic 
analysis of 154 evaluations, consisting of 92 evaluations of adult drug courts, 34 juvenile 
drug courts, and 28 DWI courts (Mitchell, Wilson, Eggers, & MacKenzie, 2012).  
Effectiveness depended on the type of drug court.  Mitchell, et al, (2012) found drug 
court participants recidivate at a lesser rate than non-participants and adult drug courts 
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were effective in reducing recidivism.  Questions were raised as to whether participants 
continued to follow treatment methods after completion of the drug court program.  Some 
claimed participants were successful during drug court, due to the rigorous oversight 
while within the program and treatment.  Mitchell, et al. (2012) found positive results of 
reduced recidivism not only during drug court, but also after drug courts, up to three 
years after drug court.       
Even with these reported benefits, the Trump Administration prioritized treatment 
and prevention, but also heard the former Attorney General Jeff Sessions state general 
recidivism rates were “unacceptably high” (TCR Staff, 2018).  The Trump 
Administration tasked the director of the National Institute of Justice to address and 
reduce these high numbers (TCR Staff, 2018).  Even with presidential administration 
financial support, and the reported benefits, cost-effectiveness, and support from the 
criminal justice system, there is little research on whether the public support tax dollars 
spent on drug court. 
Prior research has shown a shift in thinking as it relates to treatment versus 
punishment. In 2006, the General Social Survey asked two relevant questions to this 
research.  First, the respondents were asked if the government was spending too much, 
too little, or about the right amount of money when dealing with drug addiction.  The 
second question asked if the government was spending too much, too little or about the 
right amount of money on drug rehabilitation (Smith, Davern, Freese, & Morgan, 2019).  





Dealing with Drug Addiction in 2006 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid TOO LITTLE 906 20.1 63.4 63.4 
ABOUT RIGHT 401 8.9 28.1 91.5 
TOO MUCH 121 2.7 8.5 100.0 
Total 1428 31.7 100.0  
Missing IAP 3026 67.1   
DK 54 1.2   
NA 2 .0   
Total 3082 68.3   




Dealing with Drug Addiction in 2016 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid TOO LITTLE 918 32.0 65.8 65.8 
ABOUT RIGHT 367 12.8 26.3 92.1 
TOO MUCH 110 3.8 7.9 100.0 
Total 1395 48.7 100.0  
Missing IAP 1430 49.9   
DK 40 1.4   
NA 2 .1   
Total 1472 51.3   
Total 2867 100.0   
 
In a decade, respondents reported believing the government was doing too little in 
dealing with drug addiction, while there was also a small increase in the belief the 
government was doing too much. When it comes to drug rehabilitation, there was an 
increase in respondents who believed the government was not doing enough for drug 
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rehabilitation, but there was also an increase in those who believed the government was 
spending “about right” and “too much.”  
Table 3 
 
Drug Rehabilitation in 2006 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid TOO LITTLE 777 17.2 55.7 55.7 
ABOUT RIGHT 463 10.3 33.2 88.9 
TOO MUCH 155 3.4 11.1 100.0 
Total 1395 30.9 100.0  
Missing IAP 3002 66.6   
DK 113 2.5   
Total 3115 69.1   
Total 4510 100.0   
Table 4 
 
Drug Rehabilitation in 2016 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid TOO LITTLE 850 29.6 62.6 62.6 
ABOUT RIGHT 357 12.5 26.3 88.9 
TOO MUCH 151 5.3 11.1 100.0 
Total 1358 47.4 100.0  
Missing IAP 1437 50.1   
DK 70 2.4   
NA 2 .1   
Total 1509 52.6   
Total 2867 100.0   
Note. from Smith et al. (2019).  
In a ten-year span, respondents continued to believe the government was not 
doing enough dealing with drug addiction. When asked if the government was doing 
enough with drug rehabilitation, the number of respondents who believe the government 
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spends too much remained the same, but there was an increase in those who believed 
there was too little government action.   
Pew Research Center (2014) noted about a third of Americans believe drug abuse 
is a crisis and 55% see drug abuse as a serious problem.  Even with many Americans 
viewing drug abuse as a significant problem, 63% report agreement with states dropping 
mandatory drug sentences compared to 32% (Pew Research Center, 2014).  Older 
Americans and Republicans are more likely to have concerns about dropping mandatory 
drug offenses, 49% of Republicans were positive toward eliminating mandatory drug 
sentences compared to 41% in 2001 (Pew Research Center, 2014).  Democrats were 
supportive of this drug policy change with 66% in 2014 compared to 48% in 2001 (Pew 
Research Center, 2014). When asked whether the government should focus on treatment 
as opposed to prosecuting illegal drug users, the consensus was to provide treatment with 
67%, compared to just 26% supportive of prosecution (Pew Research Center, 2014).  
Similar to elimination of mandatory drug sentences, Democrats (77%) and Independents 
(69%) wanted government policy to reflect treatment, compared to 51% of Republicans 
(Pew Research Center, 2014).   
Public Opinion Influences Criminal Justice Policy 
Meithe, Lu, and Reese (2000) discuss the reintegrative shaming of drug court 
participants as social control to promote conformity over deviance.  It is the power of 
society which controls an individual’s behavior; thus, drug court participants want to be 
part of society, not stigmatized.  It is the power of society which makes the individual 
conform to society’s standards.  The very same idea or concept of power can be 
28 
 
applicable when seeking public support for drug courts utilizing the same method used 
for drug court participants to conform their behavior to society’s standards.   
Power has the capability to effect change or influence one or more in their thought 
process.  French and Raven (1959) define power as influence or influencing 
psychological change.  Change can be thoughts, opinions, ideas, values and behavior 
(French & Raven, 1959).  French and Raven (1959) identify five types of power: referent, 
expert, reward, coercive, and legitimate power.  They note more power is related to 
having a strong base of power, meaning the stronger the base power, the greater the 
power one has (French & Raven, 1959).  This concept of power is applicable when 
looking at governmental resources.   
Government resources are controlled and funded by executive and legislative 
branches of government.  Obtaining funding is necessary for the judicial branch to 
continue to function properly.  Considering recidivism and the increasing numbers of 
defendants, especially drug offenders, injecting financial resources into an area which 
could reduce costs for law enforcement, corrections, and ultimately society.   
Legislative funding is a method to ensure drug courts receive appropriate and 
proper funding.  When determining funding, power becomes quite relevant in the 
legislative body and the public.  Power is a word that has a variety of definitions.  Dahl 
(1957) proposed a definition of power as a relation among people.  It is a power relation 
or that someone has “power” over another (Dahl, 1957).  Dahl (1957) also suggests there 
is more, such as the source of power, the means to exert influence, the extent of power 
and the scope of power.  At the most basic level, legislators have the power of the purse 
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strings over society.  However, each legislator is beholden to their respective electorate 
and districts who hold power over their elected official.  With this power over an elected 
official, the power of the ballot can influence the elected official.   
The power of the ballot can influence legislative bodies to determine legislative 
funding priorities.  As a legislator answers to one’s electorate, their priorities are also 
reflective of the priorities of voters.  Legislators can be influenced and fund initiatives 
they see as a better return on their investment, such as choosing funding between 
education and treatment for drug addicted criminals.  The voters have the influence over 
legislative priorities, which can include new initiatives for the court system.   
In November 2016, a survey of 1000 registered voters, followed by 30 interviews, 
concluded people believe the court system is unique, but need to adapt to new 
technologies to meet the needs of their customers (Gerstein, Bocian, Agne [GBA] 
Strategies, 2016).  Innovative sentencing options and other methods to reduce the flow of 
defendants through the justice system would reflect this thought.  They also found voters 
are generally uneducated, misinformed, or misunderstand funding for the courts (GBA 
Strategies, 2016).  Ultimately GBS Strategies (2016) found most voters do not know or 
understand how tax dollars are spent.  This is a troubling concept in that taxpayers and 
voters are not aware of how their money is being spent and ultimately do not understand 
or even overestimate where funds are being spent (GBA Strategies, 2016).  This would 
include the areas of being innovative, such as drug courts.   
Most drug court programs are left to obtain funding from federal grant programs, 
which are also limited with funds diverted to other areas, including law enforcement and 
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crime control.  It becomes a fight over the small pool of money.  When federal grant 
funds are obtained, it is not a guarantee funding will continue, nor a guarantee it will 
cover all costs related to the drug court.  Many grants implement a requirement of 
matching funds, requiring state and local governments to fund drug court as well.  The 
grant funds are also not guaranteed from year to year.   
Public opinion affects policy about three quarters of the time when the impact is 
gauged (Burstein, 2003).  When an issue is determined to be “important” or “salient,” 
public opinion appears to have great influence.  (Burstein, 2003).   Thus, public opinion 
can influence drug court funding if it is determined to be salient.  Little has been studied 
and published about critical topics of public opinion and public policy, especially as it 
relates to drug courts as an alternative to incarceration.  Yet, when the public, privately or 
in public, argue their voice or vote does not mean anything, this seems to be untrue.  
Evidence suggests the more important, or salient, an issue, the more government listens 
and the more policy is affected.  There is little evidence government responsiveness has 
declined when there is public opinion and support (Burstein, 2003).  The argument the 
government does not listen is far from the truth.  The public holds more power than it 
believes, and the government tends to be more responsive to public opinion than what the 
public believes.     
One of the most compelling research projects on public opinion on drug treatment 
or incarceration was based out of Pinellas County, Florida.  Giordano (2014) wanted to 
discover how open the public is to reform on the War on Drugs and whether they support 
treatment or incarceration.  Because Miami, Florida created the first Drug Court, 
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Giordano’s study was interesting to see whether there was more support for treatment or 
incarceration.  Giordano (2014) found there was very little research in this area, noting 
there have been several small opinion polls suggesting drug treatment is best. Opinion 
polls can be questionable especially when the results varied between support for the War 
on Drug and drug treatment (Giordano, 2014).   
In his study, Giordano (2014) assessed the public’s views on drug treatment rather 
than incarceration and whether that answer was influenced by the individual’s view of 
drug addiction.  He utilized the Maryland Voter Survey and other questions he developed 
(Giordano, 2014).  Giordano (2014) found slightly over half of the respondents (51.1%) 
believe drug treatment was better than incarceration, however, this appears to be 
significantly affected by the respondents view of whether addiction was a choice or a 
disease.  51.7% of respondents found addiction was a choice, as opposed to 31% seeing 
addiction as a disease (Giordano, 2014).  Those who see addiction as a disease, 
overwhelmingly viewed treatment, as opposed to incarceration, as the appropriate method 
(Giordano, 2014). Yet even with the support toward treatment to combat drug addiction, 
Giordano (2014) also found more respondents supported a reduction in funding for 
treatment as opposed to money spent on incarceration.  Giordano (2014) acknowledges 
this is interesting and “implausible” especially when there was more support for 
treatment when the respondent knew the courts were supervising drug offenders in 
treatment.  
There is a “definite deficit in research of this subject” especially considering the 
support for treatment, yet reduction in support for funding (Giordano, 2014).  Little 
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research has been completed as it relates to the debate on the War on Drugs and the 
treatment vs. incarceration dilemma.  In fact, in the last decade and a half, there has been 
little research on the War on Drugs and public opinion.  This is surprising considering the 
severe uptick in opioid abuse and overdose deaths.  While the Trump Administration has 
acknowledged the opioid crisis and provided funding toward reduction for this drug 
abuse, there appears to be little research recently on drug courts, public opinion or the 
War on Drugs.   
Summary 
Research shows the American public no longer believes the War on Drugs is 
effective and they want change.  The public also wants the government to do 
“something” about the drug problem.  Previously, the consensus was to send drug 
offenders to prison.  Incarceration was the predominant theme; however, this has changed 
when the public realized prison populations were continually increasing. The illegal drug 
problem was not affected by incarceration.  The public’s views changed to a softer and 
kinder viewpoint---treatment.  While treatment was gaining ground, not everyone was 
convinced drug abusers should avoid prison; however, treatment and treatment options 
gained ground.   
Problem-solving courts, and in this specific instance, drug courts entered the 
picture in the 1990’s in light of the increase in drug deaths, violence and crime.  Drug 
courts opened across the country in search of a way to decrease the prison population and 
most importantly, reduce recidivism.  In addition to those goals, one of the most vital was 
cost savings.  Drug courts claimed to save taxpayer money and, in most circumstances, it 
33 
 
was less expensive to place a drug offender in drug court as opposed to prison.  In some 
instances, recidivism rates were less for those who entered drug court.  There was a sign 
of cost-benefits for drug courts.   
Prior research focused almost exclusively on treatment in general. Drug courts 
pose an interesting conundrum. While drug court is treatment, it is also court or judicial 
supervised with the threat of incarceration for rules violations or failing the program.  It is 
not a “get out of jail free” card.  Some studies have shown drug court participants might 
serve more time behind bars than if sent to prison originally.   
What support will the public have in a Midwestern state where methamphetamine 
was a significant problem, as compared to the State where the first drug court was 
incorporated and suffered through severe cocaine wars, for drug treatment as opposed to 
incarceration if there is judicial oversight through drug court?  The question then 
becomes what if the policy combines treatment and punishment?  Will judicial oversight 
of treatment via drug courts convert those who believe in incarceration?  The next 
question will be, if there is public support for drug courts and judicial oversight, will 
judges support drug courts and sentence individuals to this form of judicial oversight 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
Despite the reported benefits of specialty courts, there is limited research on the 
public support for these courts, especially considering the current political climate within 
the United States.  Therefore, the purpose of this study was to determine whether political 
ideology affects support for drug courts and if those who believe in incarceration as the 
best method change their opinion when they are aware of the threat of incarceration 
through drug court.  This chapter covers information on the design and methodology of 
the study.  
Research Design and Rationale 
The nature of this study is quantitative to predict whether the dependent variable 
was affected by the independent variables.  Thus, this study sought to predict whether a 
person’s political party identification indicated whether they support drug courts.  
Further, this study sought to predict whether judges are in support of drug courts based on 
public influence and gubernatorial political affiliation.  The quantitative research design 
was nonexperimental, as it attempted to predict or correlate the relationship of the 
independent and dependent variables.  The variables were analyzed for their correlation 
or predication, but the independent variables were not manipulated in any way.     
In this research, the dependent variable in each of the three research questions is 
support for drug courts.  For Research Question 1, the independent variable is political 
party identification.  In Research Question 2, the independent variables are length as a 
district court judge, prior drug court experience, and preference of treatment vs. 
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incarceration.  In Research Question 3, the independent variable is changed to reflect the 
political party of the governor who appointed the judge.   
Data were collected from judges and the public.  For Research Questions 2 and 3, 
district court judges were studied because they consider a variety of factors in 
determining the appropriate sentence of a defendant.  Judges assess a defendant’s ability 
to maintain oneself within the community in addition to age, prior history, and the 
seriousness of the crime.  Public support is technically not an appropriate consideration, 
but this research sought to determine whether public support for a program factors into a 
judge’s thought process.  This second portion of this study seeks to determine the 
influence of public opinion and the amount of this influence over a judge when 
determining sentencing options for a defendant. A quantitative design was chosen to 
maintain confidentiality of answers and provide the most reliability of responses.  
Although there is a smaller number of judges in this Midwestern state, indicating that a 
qualitative design would be best, this researcher was concerned with judges providing 
full answers with concerns of confidentiality.   
Methodology 
First, descriptive statistics were analyzed for frequency and percentages of the 
variables.  This provides an overall general view of the sample to review for balance 
among political party, race, and ethnicity.  Logistic regression statistical analysis was 
chosen to answer the research questions.  The dependent variable is dichotomous, and the 
independent variables reflect categorical and continuous variables.  Because there are 
multiple independent variables, logistic regression is the most appropriate statistical 
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analysis.  There were several statistical analyses that were considered but were 
determined not appropriate.  Analysis of variance and multivariate analysis of variance 
both require the dependent variable to be measured on a continuous level, so they were 
not appropriate for this research project, as the dependent variable reflected support or no 
support for drug court.  Based on statistical assumptions, logistic regression statistical test 
provides the most appropriate statistical analysis.   
Population 
The population for Research Question 1 consists of adults residing in one judicial 
district which comprises 11 counties in a Midwestern state.  The adults ranged from 18 
years of age to higher and registered to vote.  This judicial district was chosen because it 
has a reactivated drug court operating in only one of the 11 counties. The population for 
Research Questions 2 and 3 consist of all district court judges within the Midwestern 
state.  
Sampling and Sampling Procedure 
To ensure the registered voter sample size was sufficient to minimize any error of 
measurement, G-Power analysis was used to determine the sample pool of registered 
voters.  Based on the statistical testing of a two-tail logistic regression analysis with a 
Type-I error rate (alpha) being .05, the sample size for statistical significance was N = 
104.  A two-tailed test provides a positive or negative deviation from the hypothesized 
value can be determined to be significant.  For the best chance to obtain 104 responses, 
1,000 surveys were mailed to registered voters. Obtaining more than 104 would ensure 
greater power and statistical significance, while reducing the probability of measurement 
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error.  The sample was drawn from a random sample of 238,000 adult registered voters 
from within the 11 counties of the judicial district.   
In this Midwestern state, there are several levels of judges: magistrates, associate 
district court, district court, senior judges, and appellate courts.  District court judges 
have general jurisdiction and eligible to be assigned to drug court.  Of the eight judicial 
districts in this Midwestern state, at the time of this study, there are 116 district court 
judges.  All district court judges were surveyed with the support of the state court 
administrator.   
There was a concern about the racial make-up of the judicial district, which may 
not provide representation across all races.  There are several rural communities, with 
little diversity; however, the rural communities appear to be balanced with the larger 
metropolitan areas located within the judicial district.  There may also be concern about 
racial and gender make-up of the judicial branch, but district court judges were not asked 
about demographics because they are held to a higher standard and should not allow 
demographics to interfere with their judicial decisions.   
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation and Data Collection 
Registered voter data were obtained from the secretary of state’s office for the 
Midwestern state and was limited to the 11 counties in the judicial district.  For general 
public opinion, a paper survey was mailed to registered voters asking their opinions and 
thoughts about drug courts along with demographic information pertaining to race, 
gender, and political party.  The survey was mailed with an introduction and consent 
letter explaining the purpose and process of this study and participants’ involvement 
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rights.  This explained the research purpose to determine the public’s opinion related to 
drug court versus incarceration and judicial involvement through drug courts in their 
judicial district.  This letter also noted that the research was not politically motivated or 
tied to any political agenda.  Participants will be provided a copy of the finalized study.   
Participant confidentiality was also addressed by instructing the participant to not 
include any identification markers on the survey, including their name, address, or phone 
number.  However, to track those who participated in the survey, a number was assigned 
to each survey that corresponded to a master list of names.  This prevented repeated 
mailers from requesting their participation in the study.  The list of names was 
maintained on the researcher’s password-protected computer that only this researcher will 
have access.  All paper copies of the letter and survey will be locked in a cabinet for 5 
years.  After said timeframe, the letter and hard copies of all surveys will be shredded, 
destroyed and properly disposed.   
For the judicial survey, all district court judges for this Midwestern state were 
provided the survey by the state court administrator, who approved this survey and 
granted access to the district court judges. Participation for this study was voluntary as 
noted in the consent letter.  The letter also explained the purpose and process of this 
study, and participants’ involvement rights.  This notification explained that the purpose 
of the research is to determine the judicial opinion on issues related to drug court versus 
incarceration and judicial involvement through drug courts in the state.  This letter also 
assured the participants the research was not politically motivated or tied to any political 
agenda.   
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Due to the support of the State court administrator, the judicial survey was 
administered via online survey.  The survey link and consent letter were provided to the 
state court administrator, who forwarded it to all judges within the Midwestern state.  The 
state court administrator does not have access to the survey results.  The finalized study 
will be provided to the state court administrator who will distribute to all district court 
judges further ensuring confidentiality.   
Instrumentalization and Operationalization Constructs 
The survey for registered voters was developed by Dr. Giordano and adapted by 
this researcher of only one question.  The voter survey was designed to measure the level 
of public acceptance for drug abuse treatment in lieu of incarceration by Dr. Giordano 
(2014).  Dr. Giordano conducted a pilot test to identify issues and resolve any potential 
problems when the larger population was sampled (Giordano, 2014).   The survey was 
tested for both validity and reliability (Giordano, 2014).  Dr. Giordano used probability 
sampling for internal validity and measured reliability using Cronbach’s alpha set at .70, 
which was met (Giordano, 2014).   
The judicial survey was developed by this researcher based on this researcher’s 
personal experience within the criminal justice legal system.  The judicial sample survey 
was more complex as there were only 116 district court judges at the time of this study.  
However, there are 38 senior status judges throughout this Midwestern state.  Judicial 
sample surveys will be provided to all senior status judges to test for validity and 
reliability.   
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For RQ1, “Does an individual’s political ideology influence their support for 
funding of specialty drug courts?,” the dependent variable is “support for drug court.”  
This is measured by the survey asking whether the participant supports drug court 
(treatment) or incarceration.  This variable will be scored as 1 for treatment, 2 for 
incarceration. There is one independent variable, political party identity.  This 
independent variable is defined as the following recognized political parties: Democrat, 
Republican.  The variable will be scored as follows: Democrat (1); Republican (2).   
For RQ2, “What affect does public opinion and support for or against drug courts 
affect judges sentencing defendants to drug court as opposed to prison?”  the dependent 
variable is “support for drug court.” This is measured by the survey asking whether the 
participant supports drug court (treatment) or incarceration.  This variable will be scored 
as 1 for treatment, 2 for incarceration. There are several independent variables in RQ2.  
The first is length of time as a district court judge.  This variable is scored as follows: 0-5 
years (1); 6-10 years (2); 11-20 years (3); 21+ years (4).  The second variable is prior 
drug court experience. This variable is yes (1) or no (0).  The third variable is prior drug 
court experience, defined and scored as yes (1) or no (0).  The fourth variable is whether 
public views affect support for sentencing a defendant to drug court. This variable is 
defined and scored as yes (1) or no (0).   
For RQ3, “Are judges affected by public views sentencing a defendant to drug 
court?,” again the dependent variable is “drug court support” utilizing the same question 
from the judicial survey of treatment (1) or incarceration (0). There are two independent 
variables for RQ3.  First, the independent variable is which political party did the 
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governor belong to who appointed judge.  This is defined and scored as Democrat (1) or 
Republican (2).  The second independent variable is defined as if they are influenced by 
the gubernatorial administration’s policies when making sentencing decisions.  This is 
scored as Yes (1) or No (0). Data were analyzed through SPSS with frequency tables and 
logistic regression.    
Threats to Validity 
To eliminate any threats to external validity for the voter survey, this researcher 
used the judicial district of the Midwestern state consisting of eleven counties.  
Registered voter data was obtained from the Secretary of State as of April 1, 2019.  
According to the Secretary of State’s website, in the eleven-county district there were 
34.45% active Democrats, 28.40% active Republicans, 38.41% active no party, and 
.0073% active Other.  This judicial district is fairly evenly split between Democrats and 
Republicans and has a large politically independent (no party) population, the sample 
represents each of the political viewpoints, which will reduce any threats to external 
validity.    
For the voter survey, to reduce any threats to internal validity, probability 
sampling was used to ensure random selection.  Probability sampling is used to ensure 
every possible member of a study’s population has an equal chance of being chosen to 
participate in this study.  To accomplish randomness, a list of random numbers was 
created listing all possible participants.  With this list, a random number was chosen as 
the starting point with systematic sampling of every third participant. 
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Because probability sampling is utilized to achieve randomness and the sample 
size chosen reflects the statistical test chosen, logistic regression, any threats to construct 
or statistical conclusion validity should be eliminated or significantly reduced. 
For the judicial survey, internal validity will be reduced as the sample includes all 
District Court judges within the Midwestern state.  Probability sampling is done to ensure 
every possible member of a study population has an equal chance to be selected to 
participate in this study.  In this case, every possible member of the study population does 
have an equal chance to participate as all members of the study population were provided 
this survey.   
For external validity as it relates to the judicial survey, there have been only two 
recognized political parties a governor can belong to: Democrat or Republican.  Thus, all 
District Court judges have either been appointed by a Democratic or Republic governor, 
representing the two political outlooks.  Reliability was measured via a pilot test.  This 
pilot test was administered to the senior district court judges, which number 
approximately 38.  These surveys were used in the final sample.  Reliability was 
measured using Cronbach’s alpha.  SPSS was used to determine the coefficient of 
reliability for this survey instrument with the reliability coefficient (alpha) set at .70, 
which is acceptable reliability in SPSS.       
Ethical Procedures 
As this research should remain confidential, but also understanding the researcher 
needs to track those who participated in the survey, each survey was assigned a number 
which corresponded to a master list of names.  Maintaining a list in the fashion reduces 
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the chances individuals who have completed and submitted their survey, will not be 
contacted with follow-up mailings requesting their participation.  The master list of 
names is maintained on the researcher’s password-protected computer, of which only this 
researcher will have access.  Because this is an anonymous survey and notice is being 
provided via letter, a signed letter will not be required to maintain confidentiality of the 
survey participants; however, as a master list of participants will be kept, the finalized 
study will be provided to participants.  This master list is kept separate from the surveys 
with no identifying information from the survey to the notecard.  All hard copies of the 
survey will remain in a locked cabinet for 5 years.  After 5 years, hard copies of all 
surveys will be shredded, destroyed, and properly disposed. 
The judicial survey was implemented via online survey methods.  The link to the 
online survey was emailed by the State Court Administrator to the district court judges.  
The online survey had no identifying information as this survey will remain confidential. 
No identifying information was required, and all survey results are maintained by this 
researcher with no access by the State Court Administrator to further ensure 
confidentiality.  
Summary 
This research sought to predict public support for drug courts based on their 
political ideology.  The analysis is further developed through study of judicial opinion 
related to drug courts and whether judges feel influenced by the public and gubernatorial 
administration.   
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Logistic regression analysis was chosen due to statistical assumptions and in order 
to properly predict the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable, support 
for drug courts.  Judicial surveys were provided to all district court judges in a 
Midwestern state; however, public surveys are provided only to registered voters in a 
specific judicial district consisting of eleven counties.  Data provided by the Secretary of 
State as of April 2019 reflect a balance between Democrat and Republic registered voters 
to combat threats to validity.   
Ultimately, the research seeks to determine if drug courts are an endangered 
project within the judicial system due to lack of funding.  Funding is vital for drug court 
sustainability.  With funding and budgets tightening, what influence will the public have 
on support for specific drug court programs.  As the research has shown, the American 
people have indicated something needs to be done by the government with the drug 
problem. Views have changed toward support for treatment, rather than prison; however, 
this is also split according to political party ideology.  For those registered voters who 
prefer incarceration over treatment, will their view change with the knowledge of judicial 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether political party predicted 
support for drug courts in a Midwestern state.  Further, this study also set out to 
determine or predict whether public support or the state’s gubernatorial policies affected 
judicial support for drug courts.  It was hypothesized an individual’s political ideology 
would influence support for drug court, and for those who previously supported 
incarceration, their support would increase for drug courts with the knowledge of judicial 
oversight.  Further, it was hypothesized public support for drug courts would influence 
judges to sentence defendants to drug court and gubernatorial administration policies 
affect judicial sentencing of defendants to drug court as opposed to prison.   
Because this study was focused on dichotomous variables, binominal logistic 
regression was used to assess whether political party predicted support for drug court and 
whether drug court would be supported if there was court supervision.  Binominal logistic 
regression analysis was not able to be used for Hypotheses 3 and 4.  These hypotheses 
became research questions as results indicated all judges were supportive of drug court.  
Hypothesis 4 became a research question as well as the results indicated judges were not 
affected by the governor’s policies. Results of the analysis are presented and analyzed in 
this chapter.   
Pilot Study 
Because this researcher developed the survey instrument for judicial data, a pilot 
study was conducted at the same time as the main study was presented to the judges.  No 
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pilot study was necessary for the public survey, as this survey instrument had been 
checked for reliability by Giordano (2014).  The judicial pilot study data was provided by 
senior status judges in this Midwestern state.  At the time of the study, there were 38 
senior status judges, and six completed the online survey.   
Because the variables were dichotomous, Kuder-Richardson 20 analysis was 
used, which measures the internal consistency at the dichotomous level (Allen, 2017).  
Cronbach’s alpha is used to establish internal consistency when the variables are not 
dichotomous; however, SPSS provides data analysis using Cronbach’s alpha.  Thus, the 
Kuder-Richardson 20 analysis utilized Cronbach’s alpha for analysis of internal 
consistency.   With 6 valid cases, Cronbach’s alpha was .581 as shown in Table 4. 




Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.581 .640 6 
 
This test, in reviewing reliability, analyzes how well the variables will hold 
together and whether the variables have a relationship with each other.  This is done by 
looking at the Cronbach’s alpha.  The recommended value for Cronbach’s Alpha is .70 
(Kline, 2005, p. 92).  The results in Table 4, indicated a lower than recommended value 
of .581 and .640.  This is most likely due to the small sample size (n = 6). 
An analysis of the relationship between the variables is shown in Table 5. Table 5 
presents the correlation matrix, which is used to determine if there is internal consistency 
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between the variables.  This also helps determine whether the items are correlated to each 
other to assist in determining reliability and internal consistency (Devellis, 2016).  
Analyzing the matrix, a few variables indicated no relationship with the other variables.  
For example, the variables pre- or post-adjudication for drug court and ever sentenced a 
defendant to drug court both were below .581.  However, these variables do not relate to 
whether judges support drug court or are affected by other’s views of drug court.  
Further, the Cronbach’s alpha increased to .719 for pre- or post-adjudication and to .693 
for ever sentencing a defendant to drug court (see Table 6).  On the other hand, if the 
other items are deleted, the consistency is decreased, specifically public views affecting 
sentencing and political party of the governor who appointed.  
Table 5 
 
Variable Correlation Matrix 
 
Length of 
time as a 
judge 


















Length of time as a 
judge 
1.000 -.316 .632 -.200 .316 .632 
Pre or Post 
Adjudication for Drug 
Court 
-.316 1.000 .250 -.316 .500 .250 
Ever assigned to Drug 
Court 
.632 .250 1.000 -.316 .500 1.000 
Ever sentenced def to 
Drug Court 
-.200 -.316 -.316 1.000 .316 -.316 
Public Views affect 
sentencing 
.316 .500 .500 .316 1.000 .500 
Political Party of Gov 
who appointed 






Cronbach’s Alpha If Item Deleted 
 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 





Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Length of time as a judge 4.83 3.767 .210 .575 
Pre or Post Adjudication 
for Drug Court 
7.33 2.667 .158 .719 
Ever assigned to Drug 
Court 
8.00 2.800 .694 .387 
Ever sentenced def to 
Drug Court 
7.83 4.567 -.267 .693 
Public Views affect 
sentencing 
8.33 2.667 .791 .344 
Political Party of Gov 
who appointed 
7.00 2.800 .694 .387 
 
The data analysis from the pilot test surveys showed no significant concerns with 
relationship and consistency.  The items reflecting no relationship were not controlling in 
this study.  This sample was small, which presents a threat to internal validity.  
Originally, the threat to internal validity was reduced because the sample included every 
district court judge within the Midwestern state.  But only six of the 38 senior status 
district court judges responded to the survey, which affected internal validity.  However, 
with the small sample size and the instrument being researcher-developed, it was 
determined that the survey instrument data could be utilized.   
Data Collection 
Participants for the public survey were chosen from a list provided by the 
secretary of state of registered eligible voters in the 11 counties that comprised the 
specific judicial district.  A total of 238,000 registered voters were eligible as 
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participants.  A total of 1,000 surveys were mailed from October 2019 through January 
2020.  A first mailing of 500 surveys were sent in early October 2019 and a second 
mailing of 500 surveys were sent in early November 2019.  Of those eligible participants 
in the first mailing, reminder surveys were sent in December 2019, and reminder surveys 
were mailed to eligible participants in the second mailing in late January 2020.   
In total, 107 public surveys were returned.  One survey was not usable because it 
was returned by a caretaker, indicating the eligible participant was not mentally capable 
of completing the survey; thus, a total of 106 viable and completed surveys were used.  
For demographics, several of the participants chose not to answer, especially when it 
came to political party.  For gender, 102 participants responded, most were female 
(57.8%, see Table 7).  There were 103 participants who reported their race.  Table 8 
shows that most participants were Caucasian/White 97.1%, with one Hispanic 1%, one 




Frequency Table for Gender 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Female 59 55.7 57.8 57.8 
Male 43 40.6 42.2 100.0 
Total 102 96.2 100.0  
Missing System 4 3.8   






Frequency Table for Race 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Other 1 .9 1.0 1.0 
Caucasian/White 100 94.3 97.1 98.1 
Hispanic 1 .9 1.0 99.0 
Asian 1 .9 1.0 100.0 
Total 103 97.2 100.0  
Missing System 3 2.8   
Total 106 100.0   
 
Far less participants reported their political party.  Of the 106 responses, Table 6 
shows only 67 participants reported their political party affiliation (see Table 9).  The 
Democratic party was reported most often with 58.2% of responses, with 41.8% 
Republicans. Thirty-nine participants chose either no response or marked “none” for 
political party affiliation.   
Table 9 
 
 Frequency Table for Political Party 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Democrat 39 36.8 58.2 58.2 
Republican 28 26.4 41.8 100.0 
Total 67 63.2 100.0  
Missing System 39 36.8   
Total 106 100.0   
 
At the time of this study, there were 116 district court judges or senior status 
district court judges within this Midwestern state.  The survey was administered via 
electronic survey and sent via the state court administrator in November 2019.  A 
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reminder email was sent to the chief justices of the judicial districts in January 2020.  The 
typical demographics of age, gender and race were not used with the judicial participants 
as age, gender, and race were not applicable to this portion of the study.   
Of the 116 eligible judicial participants, 45 responded.  As shown in Table 10, 39 
of the respondents were district court judges (86.7%), and six were senior status judges 
(13.3%). The length of time as a judge did vary considerably (see Table 11).   Table 8 
provides the length of time participants had been on the bench as district court judges.  
Eighteen judges were relatively new with 0-5 years, followed by 11 judges with 11-20 
years of experience, nine with 6-10 years of judicial experience, and seven with 20 years 
or more judicial experience.  Forty-two of the 45 judicial participants responded to which 
political party the governor belonged to who appointed them to the bench.  Most (66.7%) 
were appointed by a Republican governor (see Table 12).   
Table 10 
 
Frequency Table for District Court or Senior Status 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Senior Status Judge 6 13.3 13.3 13.3 
District Court Judge 39 86.7 86.7 100.0 









Frequency Table for Length of Time as a Judge 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0-5 years 18 40.0 40.0 40.0 
6-10 years 9 20.0 20.0 60.0 
11-20 years 11 24.4 24.4 84.4 
20+ years 7 15.6 15.6 100.0 




Frequency Table for Political Party of Governor Who Appointed Judge 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Democrat 14 31.1 33.3 33.3 
Republican 28 62.2 66.7 100.0 
Total 42 93.3 100.0  
Missing System 3 6.7   




Hypothesis one states that an individual’s political ideology influences their 
support for funding of specialty drug courts.  Binary logistic regression was performed to 
determine the effects of political party on the likelihood that participants would support 
drug court/treatment. The logistic regression model was a good fit and statistically 
significant at .001., χ(3) = 11.218, p = .001 (see Table 13).  
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The Model Summary provided additional information on the usefulness of this 
model (see Table 14).  The Cox & Snell R Square test is .154 and Nagelkerke R square 
test is .221. These two values, when read as a percentage, suggest the variability of the 
dependent variable explained by the independent variable, which for this study was 
between 15% to 22% in variability (see Table 14).  
Table 13  
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 11.218 1 .001 
Block 11.218 1 .001 
Model 11.218 1 .001 
 
 









1 68.687a .154 .221 
Note. a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates 
changed by less than .001. 
Logistic regression attempts to predict whether something will happen and 
estimates the probability of the event.  Political party did add significantly to the model at 
.002, so it was statistically significant.  In this study, when looking at the percentage 
accuracy in the classification, 71.6% were correctly classified, thus the probability of 
political party determining treatment or prison was correct 71.6% of the time (see Table 
15). Political party also is statistically significant when locating at the Wald test result 
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(see Table 16). For Political Party, Wald = 9.871, p = .002, this is statistically significant, 
hence, it contributes to the equation.   











Step 1 Treatment v.tougher 
approach 
Tougher approach 0 19 .0 
Treatment 0 48 100.0 
Overall Percentage   71.6 
Note. a. The cut value is .500 
 
Table 16  
Variables in the Equation 




Step 1a Political 
Party 
-1.917 .610 9.871 1 .002 .147 .044 .486 
Constant 1.917 .479 16.017 1 .000 6.800   
Note. a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Political Party. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis two states an individual who previously supported incarceration, will 
support Drug Court when knowing there is judicial oversight. Binary logistic regression 
was performed again to determine if court oversight would affect participants would 
support drug court/treatment. The logistic regression model was a good fit and 
statistically significant at .000., χ(3) = 39.367, p = .000 (See Table 17).  
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The Model Summary provides additional information on the usefulness of this 
model.  The Cox & Snell R Square test is .336 and Nagelkerke R square test is .554. 
These two values, when read as a percentage, suggest the variability of the dependent 
variable explained by the independent variable, which for this study was between 33% to 
55% (see Table 18).  
Table 17  
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 39.367 1 .000 
Block 39.367 1 .000 
Model 39.367 1 .000 
 










1 50.286a .336 .554 
Note. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because parameter estimates changed 
by less than .001. 
As shown in Table 19, 85.4% of participants were correctly classified. Court 
supervision did add significantly to the model at .000, p =.001, so it was statistically 
significant.  In this study, when looking at the percentage accuracy in the classification, 
85.4% were correctly classified, thus the probability of court supervision determining 
treatment or prison was correct 85.4% of the time reflected in Table 19. Court 
supervision also is statistically significant when reviewing the Wald test result (see Table 
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20).  For Treatment or Incarceration, Wald= 16.747, p = .000, this is statistically 
significant, hence, it contributes to the equation. 










Step 1 If court supervised: Prison 16 1 94.1 
Drug Treatment 13 66 83.5 
Overall Percentage   85.4 
Note. The cut value is .500 
 
Table 20  
Variables in the Equation 




Step 1a Treatment v. 
tougher 
approach 
4.397 1.075 16.747 1 .000 81.231 9.888 667.33
9 
Constant -.208 .373 .309 1 .578 .812   
Note. a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Treatment v. tougher approach. 
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis three states the more public support for drug courts will influence 
judges to sentence defendants to drug court.  Hypothesis 4 states gubernatorial 
administration policies do affect judges sentencing defendants to drug court as opposed to 
prison.  Binary logistic regression was not able to be used to analyze either hypothesis. 
As noted in Table 21, almost all respondents indicated public views did not affect 
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sentencing a defendant, with 42 of the 45 respondents indicating they were not influenced 
by public views of drug court.  All respondents agreed they were not influenced by the 
gubernatorial administration’s policies (see Table 22).  Prediction, through binary logistic 
regression, would not have been possible, as a high proportion of responses in the 
observed variable.  With the frequencies, the variables were almost absolute.  As 
hypothesis was not able to be tested in this method, hypothesis 3 and 4 have now become 
research questions: Are judges affected by public views when sentencing a defendant to 
drug court? Are judges affected by the gubernatorial policies of the administration who 
appointed the judge to the bench?  
Table 21  
Frequency Table of Public Views Affect Sentencing 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 42 93.3 93.3 93.3 
Yes 3 6.7 6.7 100.0 
Total 45 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 22  
Frequency Table if Feel influenced by Governor 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 45 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
The judicial survey also provided an opportunity for participants to write anything 
else they were willing to share.  While there could be response bias in both questions 
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about whether drug court is effective and whether they support drug court, the written 
responses support a conclusion there was not response bias in this question.   
Judicial participants commented drug court was a cost-effective way to 
rehabilitate non-violent offenders, it was economical, and proven to save money.  One 
judicial participant indicated drug courts and other community-based programs were “a 
no-brainer regardless of your political affiliation.” There seemed to be an overriding 
consensus this program worked and was beneficial to society.  Further, participants 
stating in areas where there was not a drug court, they wished there were.  To create and 
sustain a drug court, funding is necessary.  There was also a consensus from the 
respondents, the legislature should fund these programs as they were necessary and were 
effective.   
Two hypotheses were tested in this research, and the remaining two hypotheses 
became research questions.  For Hypothesis 1, the overall model, with the independent 
variable of political party, was found to be statistically significant using chi-square test 
with 1 df, N = 67 and a statistic of 11.218, at a significance level of .002.  For Hypothesis 
2, the overall model with independent variable of court supervision, was found to be 
statistically significant using chi-square test with 1 df, N = 67, and a statistic of 39.367, at 
a significance level of .000.  
As all respondents indicated there was no effect of public views of drug court, 
when it comes to judges sentencing a defendant to drug court, they will not be influenced 
by public opinion or thoughts on drug court. Additionally, all respondents indicated that 
they were not influenced by the governor when sentencing defendants to drug court, thus 
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the policies of the gubernatorial office have no effect on judges’ decisions to sentence a 
defendant to drug court.  Judicial respondents were supportive of drug courts in general 
and also, via written responses, felt financial backing would be important to promote and 
maintain drug courts.     
Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether political party would 
predict support for drug courts.  Results from the data analysis indicated there is a 
relationship between political party and support for drug courts.  Further, the data 
indicated overwhelming support for drug treatment when there was court supervision and 
even supported drug treatment for those who indicated prison previously, when there was 
court supervision.  Judges overwhelmingly supported drug courts.  Data indicated judges 
were not influenced at all from the governor’s policies, and a significant majority 
indicated public views on drug court did not affect their support or decisions.   
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
In 2010, the total number of drug arrests in the United States was approximately 
1.6 million, where it held steady except for a slight drop of about 5,000 arrests in 2017 
(“Drug War Facts," n.d.).  The highest number of arrests were in 2005 and 2006, with 
over 1.8 million arrests (“Drug War Facts,” n.d.).  Treatment options, especially drug 
court, were implemented late 1988 continuing to this day (Warren, 2009).  The main 
purpose of this research was to predict whether political party would support drug courts.   
It also studied whether those who previously supported prison might change to support 
drug court if court supervision was involved in treatment.  Finally, judicial support for 
drug court was determined, along with whether public and the governor’s office affected 
their support for drug courts.  The public were more inclined to support treatment over 
incarceration to address this problem.  The judicial respondents significantly agreed drug 
court was effective, some had previously been assigned to a drug court, and others had 
even sentenced a defendant to drug court.   Results also indicated political party does 
predict support for drug court.  Further, those who supported incarceration chose to 
support treatment if it was court supervised.  Finally, judicial results indicated unanimous 
support for drug court, little to no influence by the public, and zero influence by the 
governor.   
Interpretation of the Findings 
Drug courts are controversial because they utilize the court system, which 
requires governmental funding which comes from politicians.  Politicians are the elected 
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body of the federal and state government by registered voters.  Drug courts can be 
economically beneficial, especially when there are large pools of federal grant funds 
available (Hoffman, 2012).  Drug courts provide the ability for federal grant funding, plus 
using less taxpayer monies by diverting funds from incarceration to these problem-
solving courts.  However, though programs such as drug court rely on funding to survive 
and the judicial branch requires funding to function, governmental funding is split among 
a variety of issues, concerns, and bodies, including education and infrastructure.  The 
difficulty for elected politicians is to determine how to divide this funding; therefore, this 
study sought to determine whether political party would predict support for drug courts 
and whether the public viewpoint can assist drug courts and the criminal justice system 
with their support.   
Determining whether governmental bodies find treatment and drug court viable 
can be done by looking at the National Drug Control Budget released by the current 
executive branch in May 2017 (ONDCP, 2017).  The White House requested a budget of 
$99.9 million set aside for drug prevention and treatment, including drug courts 
(ONDCP, 2017).  In fact, from fiscal years 2016-2018, funding for treatment has 
consistently increased while law enforcement funding has remained stagnant (ONDCP, 
2017).  Included in the funding is the availability of federal grant funds.  The largest 
segment of available grants funds for drug court is the Department of Justice, Office of 
Justice Programs, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance.  For these grants, federal funds 
cannot cover more than 75% of the program’s total costs, thus the funds must be matched 
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or made “in-kind” some other way (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2016).  The “in kind” 
funding must come from some other source, such as local government funds.   
To obtain local government funds, drug courts must show a success rate or at least 
impact.  This allows a politician to point to lower recidivism rates where there is a drug 
court program, which could support funding.  An analysis of recidivism from 1994-2015 
revealed that 77% of offenders were rearrested within 5 years of release, and 29% were 
arrested for a violent crime, with a main predictor being substance abuse (Durose et al., 
2015; Katsiyannis, et al, 2018).  With substance abuse being a main predictor of 
recidivism, drug courts could be a solution, if there can be public support.  If there is 
public support, funding should follow from the legislative body.   
Based on the public’s responses in this study, the drug problem is getting worse 
and treatment needs to occur.  This study further validates Blendon and Young (1998) 
and Giordano (2014), who both found most participants believed the drug problem was 
getting worse and public support for drug treatment if court supervised.  This study also 
further supported Giordano’s contention of support for treatment over incarceration in the 
form of drug court.  This study’s results showed support for drug treatment with court 
supervision both from those who previously supported treatment but also from those who 
previously supported incarceration.   
Limitations of the Study 
The first weakness for the public survey is it was conducted via U.S. mail.  Of the 
1,000 surveys mailed, few were returned (107), and even fewer were able to be utilized 
because participants did not provide information such as which political party they are 
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registered to vote.  There may be several reasons for not completing and returning the 
surveys.  Addresses were provided via the Secretary of State who compiles the list of 
registered voters, but there was no guarantee the registered voters’ addresses were listed 
correctly when they were provided to the auditor or if the registered voter still resided at 
the address.  Second, eligible participants could have simply thrown away the survey. 
The data collection process took place the months prior to the primaries and caucuses for 
the 2020 Presidential election.  Individuals may have mistaken the mailing for political 
advertisements.   
Second, of concern, there was little demographic representation of race.  While 
race was not a predictor, it would have been interesting to see how race and political 
party ideology may have affected the results.  The predominant race was Caucasian; 
therefore, the weakness of this study includes lack of diversity in the participants.  This 
also could have been a result of the research design itself.  The participant pool included 
only registered voters.  Diversity of the registered voter pool may be affected by a variety 
of sociological issues, including certain racial populations who are ineligible to vote due 
to criminal history and/or choose not to register to vote.   
Third, of the participants, only 67 provided their political party.  This study was 
focused on whether political party predicted support for drug court.  Failing to provide 
political party contributed to the weakness of this study.  Recommendations for the 
future, could include obtaining the registered party from the Secretary of State directly 
and reconfirming through the surveys from the participants’ response.  This could be an 
effective method to complete the political party component; however, may not be 
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accurate.  The Secretary of State’s information does not include when the registered voter 
provided this information; therefore, the registered voter could have changed political 
parties and not updated their information.  The registered voter information was obtained 
prior to the November presidential caucus/primary, which could have provided updated 
or confirmed political party information for each voter.   
At the time of data collection, there were 116 district court and senior status 
district court judges, a response rate of 45 was considerably lower than anticipated.  
There may be several reasons for the lack of participation.   
First, judges may have been apprehensive sharing their opinions.  The notification 
of this research and the judicial survey came from the State Court Administrator.  This 
was done to show potential judicial participants the survey was vetted and approved if 
they chose to participate.  Unfortunately, this may have had another effect.  Potential 
judicial participants may not have participated due to concerns of confidentiality.  
Despite every attempt at ensuring confidentiality and to reduce any fears of responses 
becoming public or shared with the State Court Administrator, judges may have felt the 
need to answer a certain way, rather than how they felt or not participate at all.   
Second, if the above is true, the study is weakened as every judge indicated 
support for drug court.  This may or may not be true.  This portion of the study was 
originally planned as qualitative to obtain individual judge’s feeling and provide an in-
depth analysis for or against drug courts.  Instead, a quantitative study was developed 
which could ensure confidentiality as the judicial participant would be free to answer the 
questions due to anonymity as opposed to speaking individually with this researcher.  
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However, as noted, as the survey was delivered via the State Court Administrator, judges 
may have felt the survey was not confidential, affecting responses.     
Recommendations for Future Research 
For future research, continual depth into political party and philosophical views 
should be studied. This research presents a baseline of political party ideology and 
affiliation; however, whether political rhetoric affects the public’s view of drug court 
would be most interesting.  This study was conducted prior to the race for the 2020 
Presidential election, future research could study whether presidential statements, rhetoric 
and commentary affects public views toward substance abuse treatment in the form of 
drug courts and incarceration.   
Second, surveying a larger registered voter pool would be beneficial.  Perhaps the 
entire state rather than one judicial district for public views or even a judicial district in 
another state. Research could compare registered voters in two different states. The same 
would be true for judicial opinion as well.  Future research could include a better method 
to obtain participation, such as attending a judicial conference. This could likely increase 
the amount of judicial participation and would be completed on paper as opposed to 
online survey methods.   
Future research should include more depth in the survey. While this study focused 
on drug court support or not, it did not delve into the strength of this support.  A 
qualitative study could provide individualized answers, which could be followed up with 
further questioning.  
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The Judicial Branch should provide education to the public about drug court.  As 
French and Raven (1959) noted power as influence or influencing psychological change. 
The power of the electorate could provide the support for local drug courts if it is 
educated.  There is no power without knowledge.  Regardless of state or federal, most 
judicial branches are not political and shy away from the politics; however, it stands to 
reason if funding comes from the legislative branch, the judicial branch must use 
knowledge and power together.   
Implications and Conclusions 
There is significant potential for positive social change with this study. First, 
substance abusers have an effect on their family, themselves, and society in general.  
Forms of substance abuse treatment are necessary to combat drug addiction.  This study 
provides an alternative to prison and provides an alternative for treatment.  Drug Courts 
address addiction.  These courts can reduce the prison population and recidivism. It is not 
perfect, but it is a start to combatting a serious drug addiction that is, according to the 
public and judges, needs to be addressed.  Most importantly, there is strong judicial and 
public support for treatment and treatment alternatives.  Drug Court can fill this void of 
substance abuse treatment, while still providing oversight and sanctions if one fails to 
complete treatment.   
The legislature should listen to the public and listen to judges, who see firsthand 
the devastating effects of substance abuse.  Substance abuse wrecks families and society 
is affected by the very criminal nature substance abuse entails.  This study shows support 
for specialty drug courts; however, funding is necessary.  If funding is provided, those 
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who have substance abuse issues may have a second chance by avoiding prison and 
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